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CALIFORNIA'S SLIDING SCALE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS-FINALITY INSTEAD OF FAIRNESS
In any civil tort action, a defendant that chooses to settle with the
plaintiff must do so in "good faith." The "good faith" require-
ment is intended to avoid collusion between the settling parties to
the detriment of the non-settling defendants. The California Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde
went further, requiring more than mere'non-collusion for a settle-
ment to be in "good faith." Stressing economic fairness toward all
non-settling defendants, the court required that a settlement bear
some relation to the settling defendant's potential liability. This
Comment examines sliding scale agreements in light of Tech-Bilt.
Despite unfairness to non-settling defendants these agreements
continue to be used, contrary to the policy objectives delineated in
Tech-Bilt. The Comment concludes with proposals for alleviating
these inequities.
INTRODUCTION
"When profit is involved, the ingenuity of man spawns limitless
varieties of unfairness."1
During the daylight hours of November 21, 1977, Aloma Ander-
son was driving her International Harvester truck at normal speeds
on a California highway. After entering a curve, the truck failed to
make the turn and crashed into a steep embankment. No evidence
existed of her failure to operate the truck safely. Aloma was blinded
and received other serious injuries that kept her from testifying at
trial.2
I. River Garden Farms v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 997, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498, 506 (1972).
2. Anderson v. International Harvester, 165 Cal. App. 3d 100, 105, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 253, 256 (1985) (decertified). The California Supreme Court denied a hearing in
May 1985 and decertified the opinion of the lower court. This case, therefore, is not
authority for any propositions presented in the case. The facts of the case are used for
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Experts disclosed that the steering wheel on the truck "locked"
when a loose screw from the turn signal assembly lodged in the
steering column. General Motors (GM) designed, manufactured,
and assembled the steering column. International Harvester (IH)
purchased the steering column from GM and attached the turn sig-
nal assembly to it.
3
Aloma Anderson brought suit against both GM and IH. Prior to
trial, IH entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiff
wherein IH guaranteed the plaintiff a $900,000 recovery in her suit
against GM. If the judgment was less than $900,000, IH would pay
the difference between $900,000 and the amount of the judgment. If
the plaintiff received a judgment against GM for $900,000 or more,
IH would pay the plaintiff nothing. In return for this guarantee, the
plaintiff relieved IH from further liability, although IH remained a
defendant in the suit. This type of arrangement is known as a sliding
scale agreement.1
Prior to trial, the court determined the settlement was made in
"good faith." Under California law,5 a "good faith" determination
protects a settling tortfeasor in two ways. First, the settling
tortfeasor's liability is limited to the settlement amount.6 Second, the
settling tortfeasor is protected against claims for contribution or in-
demnity by non-settling tortfeasors.7 The intent of such protective
legislation is to encourage settlement. 8
The jury rendered a general verdict jointly and severally against
GM and IH for $1.75 million. Because the law immunizes the set-
tling tortfeasor, GM was obligated to pay the entire amount of the
illustrative purposes only.
3. id.
4. Sliding scale agreements are known in other states as Mary Carter agree-
ments, Gallagher covenants, or guaranteed verdict agreements. See generally Bodine,
The Case Against Guaranteed Verdict Agreements, 29 DEF. L.J. 232 (1980).
5. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West 1980).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(b) (West 1980). Section 877(b) provides that
the settlement "shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
any contribution to any other tortfeasor."
7. The common law doctrine of "contribution" requires all joint tortfeasors to
contribute in proportion to their respective liability. For example, if there are three joint
tortfeasors in a case, each must contribute one third of the judgment. "Indemnity" re-
quires full reimbursement of a judgment paid by one from another who was actually
responsible for the injury. The tortfeasor who has paid the judgment in full has a claim
for contribution or indemnity against other joint tortfeasors in the case. The term
"tortfeasor" as used in this Comment refers to more than one tortfeasor acting in concert
to cause injury to the plaintiff, and to "concurrent tortfeasors," who, though acting inde-
pendently, caused a single injury to the plaintiff. For simplicity, the examples in this
Comment utilize two tortfeasors, the settling defendant and the non-settling defendant.
However, the same principles apply to cases where more than two joint tortfeasors are
involved.
8. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 578, 603, 578 P.2d
899, 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 198 (1978).
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judgment under the principle of joint and several liability. IH, a cul-
pable defendant capable of paying its fair share of the judgment,
paid nothing. IH's counsel had structured a settlement that would
pass the court's "good faith" test, yet, with substantial certainty, al-
low IH to escape liability.
Recently, the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde9 revised the standard used to determine "good
faith" in settlements. Before Tech-Bilt, "good faith" meant simply
that there was no collusion, fraud, or other "tortious conduct" be-
tween the settling tortfeasor and the plaintiff, intended to undermine
the interests of any non-settling tortfeasor.10 Under Tech-Bilt, the
court now requires the settlement amount to be "in the ball park" of
what the settling joint tortfeasor would expect to pay if adjudged at
trial.11 This revision was the court's attempt to minimize the unjust
impact on non-settling tortfeasors where one of several joint
tortfeasors "settle out" of the case. 12 Tech-Bilt established a duty of
economic fairness to the non-settling tortfeasor. It did not, however,
directly address the use of sliding scale settlement agreements. 13 The
settlement contested in Tech-Bilt was an "unconditional settle-
ment""4 whereby the settling tortfeasor paid an unconditional lump
sum to the plaintiff, rather than, as in a sliding scale agreement,
merely guaranteeing a recovery against other non-settling
tortfeasors.
Confusion and unfairness remains where sliding scale agreements
are used. To date, no California court of appeal has found a sliding
scale agreement to be in "bad faith."' 5 Indeed, the standard of
"good faith" applied to sliding scale agreements has yet to be clearly
articulated or identified. This Comment examines the history of Cal-
ifornia's "good faith" settlement law and the sliding scale agree-
ment. It suggests that the California courts apply the standard es-
tablished in Tech-Bilt to sliding scale settlement agreements. In
9. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
10. Id. at 498, 698 P.2d at 165, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
11. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
12. Id. at 498-99, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
13. The settlement in issue in Tech-Bill was not a sliding scale agreement, but a
dismissal for cost. See infra text accompanying notes 36 & 39.
14. A conventional "unconditional" settlement is the more common variety of set-
tlement in which the settling tortfeasor agrees to pay the plaintiff a specified amount
with no conditions attached which would vary the amount specified. This conventional
"unconditional" settlement is referred to throughout this Comment as a conventional
settlement.
15. See infra text accompanying note 60.
addition, the Comment analyzes the goals and policies underlying
settlements by joint tortfeasors, and shows the minimal value of slid-
ing scale agreements in our legal system. Finally, legislative recom-
mendations are proposed to maximize economic fairness to non-set-
tling tortfeasors while encouraging equitable settlements.
THE HISTORY OF "GOOD FAITH" SETTLEMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
Goals of the Legislature
In 1957, the California legislature passed legislation governing in-
demnity and contribution in tort law.1" Three goals were achieved by
this legislation. First, the legislature maintained their policy of maxi-
mizing recovery to the plaintiff by retaining the concept of joint and
several liability. 17 Second, greater fairness to joint tortfeasors by eq-
uitable apportionment of liability was accomplished by removing the
punitive effect of the common law "no contribution" rule among
joint tortfeasors.18 Third, the policy of promoting settlements was es-
tablished by granting immunity to joint tortfeasors who settle in
"good faith." 19 Section 877 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure provides that a settling tortfeasor is immune from any claim for
contribution from another joint tortfeasor if he settles in "good
faith." The California Supreme Court later extended this immunity
to partial indemnity.2 0 Section 877 motivates plaintiffs to settle; it
guarantees the plaintiff some recovery through the settlement, while
reducing any judgment received by the plaintiff against a non-set-
tling tortfeasor only by the amount actually received in settlement,
rather than an amount based on the proportionate fault of the set-
tling tortfeasor.21
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West 1980).
17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(g) (West 1980). Section 875(g) provides: "This
title shall not impair the right of a plaintiff to satisfy a judgment in full as against any
tortfeasor judgment debtor."
18. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 494, 698 P.2d at 162, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
19. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). Section 877 provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to
one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same
tort-(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless
its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the
amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal of the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater; and (b) It
shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for any
contribution to any other tortfeasors.
20. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 578, 578 P.2d at 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. at
182.
21. As an example, the plaintiff is injured by joint tortfeasors D1, who is 70% at
fault, and D2 who is 30% at fault. If the plaintiff settles with D2 for $10,000 and re-
ceives a subsequent judgment against D1 for $100,000, the plaintiff collects $90,000
from Dl. The judgment is reduced by the amount of the settlement regardless of fault.
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In 1980, the legislature added section 877.6,22 which provided for
a pre-trial hearing to determine whether a settlement was made in
"good faith." This section further promotes settlement by "finaliz-
ing" the settlement, granting to the settling tortfeasor full immunity
from further liability. Prior to section 877.6, the legislature had not
determined when the issue of "good faith" was to be decided. Conse-
quently, a settling tortfeasor had been forced to participate in the
entire litigation process, even after settling, in case the settlement
was later overturned by the court.23
Despite the legislature's clearly expressed goals of maximizing
plaintiff recovery, equitable apportionment of liability, and encour-
agement of settlement, they failed to rank these goals or to define
"good faith" in section 877.6. Hence both of these issues were left to
the discretion of the courts. Absent an express standard by which
courts could determine "good faith" in settlement agreements, it was
no surprise that "good faith" determinations demonstrated little
consistency.
Interpretation of "Good Faith" by the Courts
In identifying and applying a standard of "good faith," courts
were inconsistent in incorporating the three legislative goals.24 The
courts have always emphasized maximizing plaintiff recovery as the
primary purpose of tort law.25 However, the remaining two goals,
However, if proportional fault were to be considered, the plaintiff would only collect
$70,000 from DI (70% of the $100,000 judgment).
22. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1984). Section 877.6 provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are
joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of
the settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more
alleged tortfeasors ....
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative in-
demnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
(d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on
that issue.
23. Consider this example: DI and D2 are joint tortfeasors. D1 settles with the
plaintiff prior to trial. D1, to further protect his interest, must remain in the case even
though he has settled. If the trial court later overturns the settlement as a "bad faith"
settlement, D2 would have an indemnity claim against D1 for DI's share of the judgment
based on fault percentage. Thus D1 still must defend to ensure the judgment is as low as
possible so that any potential indemnity claim would also be as low as possible.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
25. See, e.g., Roberts, The "Good Faith" Settlement: An Accommodation of
encouraging settlement and equitably apportioning liability, tend to
oppose each other. Encouraging settlement by granting immunity to
the settling tortfeasor happens at the expense of the non-settling
tortfeasor who must then pay the full amount of judgment without
indemnity from the settling joint tortfeasor. Reflecting this irony,
two tests to determine "good faith" emerged from the courts; the
"reasonable range" test, recognizing the goal of equitable apportion-
ment of liability,26 and the "tortious conduct" test, favoring settle-
ment promotion.
2 7
Early decisions, using the "reasonable range" test, demonstrated
the courts' attempt to balance the two competing goals of equitably
apportioning liability and encouraging settlement. In River Garden
Farms v. Superior Court,28 a 1972 decision, the court warned of the
potential for harsh inequities in our joint tortfeasor settlement
cases.29 The River Garden Farms court avoided a narrow definition
of a "good faith" settlement, perhaps to prevent the "ingenuity of
man" 30 from circumventing the duty of fairness intended by the
courts. The River Garden Farms court ranked the goal of equitable
apportionment of liability equally with encouragement of settlement
by requiring that the settlement not be "so poorly related to the
value of the case as to impose a potentially disproportionate cost on
the [non-settling] defendant."31 This standard became known as the
"reasonable range" test.
Other circuit courts refused to follow the River Garden Farms
"reasonable range" test, adopting instead a "tortious conduct" test
to determine the "good faith" of a settlement.32 Under the "tortious
conduct" test, barring evidence of tortious or wrongful conduct in-
tended to injure the interests of non-settling tortfeasors, the settling
parties were free to further their own interests.3 The amount of the
settlement was irrelevant. As a result of the "tortious conduct" test,
the goal of fairness to the non-settling defendant and equitable ap-
portionment of liability fell by the wayside. Due, perhaps, to over-
crowded court dockets, criticism of growing legal costs, and the ease
with which the "tortious conduct" test could be administered, settle-
ment promotion became the primary goal. The lower courts, how-
Competing Goals, 17 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 841, 883 (1984).
26. See infra text accompanying note 31.
27. See infra text accompanying note 33.
28. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
29. See supra text accompanying note 1.
30. Id.
31. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
32. See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior Ct., 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr.
843 (1976); Fisher v. Superior Ct., 103 Cal. App. 3d 433, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980);
Dompeling v. Superior Ct., 177 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981).
33. Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
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ever, observing the blatantly unfair settlements that often resulted,
were uncomfortable applying the "tortious conduct" test.34 Further,
they erroneously believed they were compelled to apply the "tortious
conduct" test until either the legislature or the California Supreme
Court decided otherwise.35
Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde-The California Supreme Court
Redefines "Good Faith"
In 1985, the California Supreme Court finally rejected the "tor-
tious conduct" test, placing the goal of fairness to non-settling
tortfeasors on equal footing with the goal of settlement promotion. In
Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde,36 the plaintiff, owner of a residential
property, sued Tech-Bilt, the developer, and Woodward-Clyde, the
soil engineer, to recover damages for structural defects in the resi-
dence. The plaintiff could not proceed against Woodward-Clyde be-
cause the statute of limitations had run. Instead of moving for sum-
mary judgment, Woodward-Clyde's attorney convinced plaintiff's
counsel to settle with Woodward-Clyde. The plaintiff dismissed
Woodward-Clyde, with prejudice, in exchange for a waiver of court
costs of approximately fifty-five dollars.
Tech-Bilt had a cause of action not barred by the statute of limi-
tations, against Woodward-Clyde for partial indemnity. Because of
the settlement, however, Tech-Bilt's cross-complaint against Wood-
ward-Clyde was dismissed. The appellate court upheld this dismissal,
finding that since no tortious conduct was involved, the settlement
between Woodward-Clyde and the plaintiff was in "good faith." Had
Woodward-Clyde obtained a summary judgment against the plaintiff
based upon the statute of limitations defense, Tech-Bilt's cross-com-
plaint for indemnity would have proceeded; no "good faith" settle-
ment would have existed to invoke the protection clauses of section
877. Applying the "tortious conduct" test to section 877 allowed the
plaintiff to manipulate the non-settling tortfeasor's right to partial
indemnity.
Recognizing the inequities caused by the "tortious conduct" test,
the California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and
34. Cardio Systems v. Superior Ct., 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 891, 176 Cal. Rptr.
254, 260 (1981); Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Ct., 137 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 376, 379 (1982).
35. Cardio Systems, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260; Burlington,
137 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
36. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
adopted a version of the River Garden Farms "reasonable range"
test. The Supreme Court decided the amount of the settlement was
relevant in determining "good faith," noting:
[T]he intent and policies underlying sec. 877.6 require that a number of
factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of the plain-
tiff's total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid
in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs and a
recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he
were found liable after trial. Other relevant considerations include the fi-
nancial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well
as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the
interests of non-settling defendants.
7
Under Tech-Bilt, the duty of economic fairness to non-settling
tortfeasors is finally on equal footing with encouraging settlement
where "unconditional" settlements are concerned. A tortfeasor,
choosing to go to trial, may be confident that liability will be equita-
bly distributed among all tortfeasors capable of paying their fair
share. 38 Tech-Bilt, however, did not directly address the issue of the
sliding scale settlement agreement.3 9
In 1977, the legislature enacted section 877.5,40 which specifically
37. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
38. A tortfeasor certainly has a right to go to trial, especially if he or she believes
they are not culpable. Yet, prior to Tech-Bilt, many tortfeasors could conceivably be
coerced into forgoing that right and settling in fear that they would be saddled with a
large judgment because the most culpable of the tortfeasors had settled for a disporpor-
tionately low amount.
39. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264. Al-
though the settlement in Tech-Bilt was not a sliding scale agreement, the court, in a
footnote, stated its disapproval of Dompeling and Burlington. Both of these cases in-
volved sliding scale agreements. Id. n.7.
40. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 1980). Section 877.5 provides:
(a) Where an agreement or covenant is made which provides for a sliding
scale recovery agreement between one or more, but not all, alleged defendant
tortfeasors and the plaintiff or plaintiffs:
(I) The parties entering into any such agreement or covenant shall promptly
inform the court in which the action is pending of the existence of the agree-
ment or covenant and its terms and provisions; and
(2) If the action is tried before a jury, and a defendant party to the agree-
ment is a witness, the court shall, upon motion of a party, disclose to the jury
the existence and content of the agreement or covenant, unless the court finds
that such a disclosure will create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of con-
fusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
The jury disclosure herein required shall be no more than necessary to be
sure that the jury understands (1) the essential nature of the agreement, but
not including the amount paid, or any contingency, and (2) the possibility that
the agreement may bias the testimony of the alleged tortfeasor or tortfeasors
who entered into the agreement.
(b) As used in this section a "sliding scale recovery agreement" means an
agreement or covenant between a plaintiff or plaintiffs and one or more, but
not all, alleged tortfeasor defendants, where the agreement limits the liability
of the agreeing tortfeasor defendants to an amount which is dependent upon
the amount of recovery which the plaintiff is able to recover from the
nonagreeing defendant or defendants. This includes, but is not limited to,
agreements within the scope of Section 877, and agreements in the form of a
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addressed the use of sliding scale agreements. The Tech-Bilt deci-
sion, which applies the "reasonable range" test to unconditional set-
tlements, does not eliminate the inequities found in the use of sliding
scale agreements. A legislative act is necessary to insure the elimina-
tion of these inequities. The remainder of this Comment addresses
sliding scale agreements, the unfairness that results to non-settling




Sliding scale settlement agreements limit the settling tortfeasor's
liability to a guaranteed amount. What the tortfeasor ultimately
pays depends upon the amount the plaintiff recovers from non-set-
tling tortfeasors at trial. For example, where the settling tortfeasor
guarantees the plaintiff a one million dollar recovery, and the plain-
tiff receives a $750,000 judgment, the settling tortfeasor must pay
the plaintiff the $250,000 difference to fulfill the guarantee of one
million dollars. If the plaintiff receives a judgment of one million
dollars or greater, the settling tortfeasor pays nothing, regardless of
his degree of fault.
If the court accepts the settlement as one made in "good faith,"
the settling tortfeasor receives immunity from the non-settling
tortfeasor's claim for indemnity under section 877.6. The entire
judgment must be paid by the non-settling tortfeasor. Other inequi-
table provisions typically found in sliding scale agreements are those
which prohibit the plaintiff from settling with other tortfeasors, 1 or
require the plaintiff to appeal a case if the judgment is less than the
guaranteed amount. Some provide for loans from the settling
tortfeasor to the plaintiff, to be repaid from the subsequent judg-
ment,4' and allow the settling tortfeasor to remain a party to the
loan from the agreeing tortfeasor defendant to the plaintiff or plaintiffs which
is repayable in whole or in part from the recovery against the nonagreeing
tortfeasor defendant.
41. Burlington, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
42. Abbott Ford v. Superior Ct., 166 Cal. App. 3d 280, 212 Cal. Rptr. 389, h'g
granted, cause retransferred for reconsideration in light of Tech-Bilt, 701 P.2d 1172,
215 Cal. Rptr. 854, affid, 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, h'g granted, No.
85-181 (Dec. 19, 1985). For a discussion of this case and its subsequent history, see infra
note 71 and accompanying text.
43. Abbot Ford, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
litigation.44 The unfairness of such agreements is obviously increased
when the settling tortfeasor's liability exceeds that of non-settling
tortfeasors. The ultimate effect of such an agreement is to give the
plaintiff and settling tortfeasor substantial power to manipulate joint
and several liability, at the expense of non-settling tortfeasors.
The Development of Sliding Scale Agreements
Sliding scale agreements became popular across the country in the
early 1970's. The reason for their popularity is obvious in light of the
benefits to the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor. The plaintiff is
guaranteed a recovery, and has nothing to lose by proceeding against
non-settling tortfeasors. Loans to the plaintiff by the settling
tortfeasor do not "offset" the potential liability of non-settling
tortfeasors; moreover, they help finance the plaintiff's case. The ad-
versarial relationship between the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor
vanishes, allowing the plaintiff to concentrate on the case against the
non-settling tortfeasors.'6
Benefits to the settling tortfeasor are equally attractive. The set-
tling tortfeasor joins forces with the plaintiff against the non-settling
tortfeasor. This increases the probability of a judgment in excess of
the guaranteed amount.46 The settling tortfeasor also minimizes his
own exposure by guaranteeing a specific amount; the probability of
paying less than that amount or even nothing is significant. More-
over, the settling tortfeasor eliminates liability for contribution or in-
demnity. Consequently, the sliding scale agreement is most attractive
to the most blameworthy of joint tortfeasors.47
In 1977, the California legislature, recognizing the potential for
collusion between the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor, enacted
section 877.5 to set guidelines for the use of sliding scale agree-
ments. 8 Section 877.5 requires that the court be informed of any
sliding scale agreement.49 This disclosure is intended to eliminate
collusion between the plaintiff and a settling tortfeasor. The court
then has the discretion to disclose elements of the agreement to the
jury. This serves to make the jury aware of the potential for bias in
the settling tortfeasor's testimony. The amount of the guarantee,
44. Anderson v. International Harvester, 165 Cal. App. 3d 100, 106, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 253, 256 (1985) (decertified). See supra note 2.
45. Wesierski, Mary Carter Agreements and Good Faith Settlements-Are They
Both Possible in California?, 48 INS. COUNSEL J. 639 (1981).
46. Thornton & Wick, Loan Receipt Agreements; Are They Loans, Settlements,
Wagering Contracts, or Unholy Alliances?, 43 INs. COUNS. J. 226, 228 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Comment, Sliding Scale Agreements and the Good Faith Requirement of
Settlement Negotiation, 12 PAc. L.J. 121, 123 (1980).
49. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(1) (West 1980). See supra note 40.
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however, cannot be disclosed to the jury."
Despite these precautions, the settling tortfeasor enjoys a tremen-
dous advantage. The prejudice which section 877.5 attempts to elim-
inate can be circumvented by the settling tortfeasor remaining in the
case. Counsel for the settling tortfeasor may aid in picking a biased
jury, or present opening and closing statements which will prejudice
the non-settling tortfeasor's defense. The settling tortfeasor's counsel
has the ability to cross-examine and lead friendly witnesses .5  The
settling tortfeasor may abandon defenses asserted earlier, removing
from the jury's consideration issues potentially adverse to the plain-
tiff's case. Such tactics help insure a larger verdict5 2 -the ultimate
goal of the settling tortfeasor who has entered into a sliding scale
agreement.
Even where the settling tortfeasor is dismissed from the case, diffi-
culties remain for the non-settling tortfeasor. Because the jury may
be informed of the agreement, but not informed of the guaranteed
amount,53 a jury unfamiliar with sliding scale agreements may think
they must render a large verdict against the non-settling tortfeasor.
The jury may blame the non-settling tortfeasor for not settling. The
existence of the agreement itself may signify to the jury that at least
one of the joint tortfeasors believes the plaintiff's lawsuit has merit.
The jurors may develop the erroneous belief that the non-settling
tortfeasor is unreasonable because he did not settle, leading them to
impute liability by default.5'
If a tortfeasor is not the first to settle, virtually any chance to
settle is lost. Most sliding scale agreements contain clauses giving
the settling tortfeasor the power to veto settlements with remaining
tortfeasors 5 5 Thus, unless a non-settling tortfeasor agrees to an
amount in excess of the guarantee, the settling tortfeasor can be ex-
pected to veto the settlement. The plaintiff has little incentive to set-
tle with remaining tortfeasors, having been guaranteed a significant
recovery. Further, when a loan from the settling tortfeasor is in-
volved, the plaintiff cannot afford to settle; the plaintiff must proceed
to judgment to repay the loan.
Of the most significance, perhaps, is that the non-settling
50. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(2) (West 1980). See supra note 40.
51. Wesierski, supra note 45, at 644.
52. Grant, The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problems of Collusive Set-
tlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (1974).
53. See supra text accompanying note 50.
54. Bodine, supra note 4, at 246.
55. See supra text accompanying note 41.
tortfeasor receives no credit for the settlement. Under section 877, in
the case of unconditional settlements, any judgment against a non-
settling tortfeasor is offset by the amount paid in settlement by the
settling tortfeasor. 56 If a plaintiff unconditionally settles with one
tortfeasor for $25,000 then receives a judgment against a non-set-
tling tortfeasor for $100,000, the non-settling tortfeasor pays only
$75,000. A credit is applied for the amount received in settlement.
In sliding scale settlement agreements, however, the plaintiff receives
only a guarantee from the settling tortfeasor rather than an actual
payment. The non-settling tortfeasor receives no credit against any
subsequent judgment. It is the settling tortfeasor who receives credit
for the judgment. 57 The intent of section 87758 is thus undermined
through the use of the sliding scale settlement. In sliding scale agree-
ment cases, non-settling tortfeasors are treated differently under the
statutory scheme of section 877.5 than are non-settling tortfeasors in
unconditional settlement cases. This scheme might be challenged as
unconstitutional; it may deny non-settling tortfeasors equal protec-
tion under the due process clauses of the California and federal
constitutions.5"
Section 877.5 represents a gallant effort to look into the future
and provide a method of avoiding potential prejudice caused by slid-
ing scale agreements. However, the ten year history of sliding scale
agreements and section 877.5 reveals that these legislative efforts
were insufficient to avoid gross unfairness to non-settling tortfeasors.
Under the recent Tech-Bilt decision, the court has placed renewed
emphasis on economic fairness towards non-settling tortfeasors and
equitable apportionment of liability. Based upon the inequities found
in sliding scale agreement cases since the enactment of section 877.5
and the renewed emphasis on economic fairness under Tech-Bilt,
further legislation is necessary.
56. See supra note 19.
57. Using the same example, assume the plaintiff entered into a sliding scale
agreement instead of a conventional settlement with D1 where D1 guaranteed the plain-
tiff a $25,000 recovery instead of actually paying the plaintiff the $25,000. If the plaintiff
then receives the same $100,000 judgment against D2, D2 must now pay the entire judg-
ment instead of $75,000. D2 receives no credit for the settlement between the plaintiff
and Dl. DI pays the plaintiff nothing because the judgment was greater than the
$25,000 guaranteed.
58. See supra text accompanying note 18.
59. Equal protection requires that a law treat all individuals in the same manner
unless the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See Cooper v.
Bray, 21 Cal. 3d 841, 582 P.2d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978). The only possible legiti-
mate state interest would be encouraging settlements. This Comment suggests, however,
that this is not a rationally related state interest.
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Recent California Cases
The sliding scale agreement is becoming increasingly popular.
Since the River Garden Farms case in 1972, only thirteen appellate
cases in California have questioned the "good faith" requirement of
sliding scale agreements. However, seven of these cases have been
heard in the last year. 60 No appellate court has ever held a sliding
scale agreement to be in "bad faith."
The "good faith" requirement of the sliding scale agreement has
been analyzed by the courts via four different methods. Under the
first method, courts have applied a lesser standard of "good faith" to
sliding scale agreements than to unconditional settlements.6' Under
a second method, the "tortious conduct" test has been applied, pro-
ducing a finding that no tortious conduct was involved.62 Under a
third method, courts have found the amount guaranteed, although
never paid by the settling tortfeasor, within a reasonable range of the
settling tortfeasor's proportional share of liability. 3 Finally, under a
fourth method, courts have found that a minimum amount actually
paid by the settling tortfeasor was within the "reasonable range" of
the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of liability.
6 4
The Tech-Bilt decision, while defining "good faith" in uncondi-
tional settlements, does not conclusively determine whether sliding
scale agreements meet the "good faith" requirement. The remainder
of this section analyzes the four methods of analyzing the "good
faith" requirement, and discusses how the courts might apply these
60. See River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 498;
Pease v. Beach Aircraft, 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974); Young v. Lane
Realty, 96 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1979) (decertified); Dompeling, 117
Cal. App. 3d at 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 38; Baget v. Shepard, 128 Cal. App. 3d 433, 180
Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982) (decertified); Burlington, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 942, 187 Cal. Rptr.
at 376; Torres v. Union Pacific, 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984); Impe-
rial Spa v. Superior Ct., 158 Cal. App. 3d 1185, 205 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1984) (decertified);
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct., 160 Cal. App. 3d 489, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984)
h'g granted, (Nov. 21, 1984), retransferred for reconsideration in light of Tech-Bill
(July 18, 1985), remanded to trial court, Civil No. B005694 (Jan. 21, 1986); Moreno v.
Sayre, 162 Cal. App. 3d 116, 208 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1984); Anderson v. International Har-
vester, 165 Cal. App. 3d 100, 211 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985) (decertified); Abbott Ford v.
Superior Ct., 166 Cal. App. 3d 280, 212 Cal. Rptr. 389, h'g granted, cause retransferred
for reconsideration in light of Tech-Bilt, 701 P.2d 1172, 215 Cal. Rptr. 854, aff'd, 172
Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, h'g granted, No. 85-181 (Dec. 19, 1985); River-
side Steel Construction Co. v. William H. Simpson Construction Co., 171 Cal. App. 3d
781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, h'g granted, No. 85-182 (Dec. 19, 1985).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 65 & 67.
62. See infra text accompanying note 71.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 76 & 77.
64. See infra text accompanying note 78.
methods in light of Tech-Bilt.
Applying a Lesser Standard of "Good Faith"
In 1975, the Third District Court of Appeal, in Young v. Lane
Realty, held that in enacting section 877.5 the legislature whole-
heartedly endorsed sliding scale agreements. Therefore the "good
faith" requirement of unconditional settlements did not apply to the
sliding scale agreement.0 5 Although Young has been decertified, the
case illustrates the potential danger of unfairness to non-settling
tortfeasors. The legislative history of section 877.5 does not suggest
that the legislature intended a lesser standard be applied to sliding
scale agreements.66 Yet, more recent cases do suggest that a lesser
standard or even no standard be applied.
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Superior Court,7 a plaintiff,
seriously injured by a falling door of a railroad car, sued Burlington
(the railroad) and Paccar (the manufacturer of the door). Burlington
entered into a sliding scale agreement with the plaintiff guaranteeing
a two million dollar recovery. Burlington reserved the right to reject
any settlement between the plaintiff and Paccar for less than the
guaranteed amount. Paccar challenged the settlement and the trial
court agreed with Paccar, finding that the settlement was not made
in "good faith" since it ignored equitable apportionment of liability
and failed to promote settlement of litigation.6 8 Although the court
of appeal recognized the inequities of this result, they reversed the
trial court's decision, stating that "given the legislative approval of
sliding scale agreements, . . . the trial court's finding of unfairness
cannot support a conclusion that the settlement was not made in
'good faith'."6 9 This analysis ignores the policy underlying the Tech-
Bilt decision, and makes all sliding scale agreements per se in "good
faith" even when evidence of tortious conduct exists. The fallacy of
the method is apparent; the legislature did not intend a lesser stan-
65. Young v. Lane Realty, 96 Cal. App. 3d. 294, 158 Cal. Rptr. 71, 73 (1979)
(decertified). A decertified case is of no precedential value.
66. Nothing in the available evidence regarding the legislative intent of § 877.5
suggests that the "good faith" requirement of § 877 was not to be applied to sliding scale
agreements. The wording of the statute itself only addresses the quasi-evidentiary con-
cern of disclosure of the agreement to the court and never discusses the issue of "good
faith." See Comment, supra note 48, at 139.
There is also evidence that the legislature enacted § 877.5 not to further encourage
settlement but in response to growing concern over the appropriateness of sliding scale
agreements. The legislature was attempting to prevent abuse of such agreements. With
such an intent, the legislature certainly was not suggesting that a lesser standard of
"good faith" be applied to sliding scale agreements. See Review of Selected 1977 Cali-
fornia Legislation, 9 PAC. L.J. 362, 363 (1977).
67. 137 Cal. App. 3d 945, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982).
68. Id. at 945, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
69. Id. at 947, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
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dard of "good faith" to be applied in sliding scale agreements."
Applying the "Tortious Conduct" Test
Prior to Tech-Bilt, most courts applied the "tortious conduct" test
to sliding scale agreements. In Abbot Ford v. Superior Court,7' t.he
most recent case prior to Tech-Bilt, the wheel of a passing vehicle
flew into the plaintiff's windshield. The plaintiff, permanently
blinded, sued Ford Motor Company, Abbott Ford, and Sears Roe-
buck on various theories of negligence, products liability, and breach
of warranty. Under a sliding scale agreement, Abbott's insurer guar-
anteed the plaintiff a recovery of $2.9 million. The agreement also
provided for periodic interest free loans to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
agreed not to settle with Ford or Sears without Abbott's consent. If
the plaintiff failed to recover the guaranteed amount from Ford and/
or Sears, the plaintiff was obligated to move for a new trial or to
appeal the case. The trial court denied Abbott's motion to declare
the agreement in "good faith," calling the agreement a "gambling
transaction" rather than a settlement agreement.7 2 Once again the
court of appeal reversed, finding no tortious conduct or motive by the
settling parties.
7 3
The "tortious conduct" test made it very easy for the courts to
avoid rocking the legislative boat. They would not have to confront
the seemingly unrestricted endorsement of sliding scale agreements
by the legislature if they could characterize the agreements as ones
made in "good faith." However, applying the "tortious conduct" test
to sliding scale agreements arguably might result in determination of
"bad faith" in every case. Through the use of a sliding scale agree-
ment, a settling tortfeasor has not only the potential, but the incen-
tive to injure his fellow non-settling tortfeasors. Even if a settling
70. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71. 166 Cal. App. 3d 280, 212 Cal. Rptr. 389, h'g granted, cause retransferred
for consideration in light of Tech-Bilt, 701 P.2d 1172, 215 Cal. Rptr. 854, affid, 172
Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605, h'g granted, No. 85-181 (Dec. 19, 1985). On July
18, 1985, the California Supreme Court granted a petition for review and retransferred
the case back to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of the principles enunci-
ated in Tech-Bilt. The appellate court held that the sliding scale agreement used in this
case did not violate the Tech-Bilt principles, and affirmed its previous decision that the
agreement was made in good faith. On December 19, 1985, the California Supreme
Court agreed to review this second decision, as well as Riverside Steel Construction Co.
v. William H. Simpson Construction Co., 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, h'g
granted, No. 85-182 (Dec. 19, 1985). Both cases present issues concerning the standards
for determining whether sliding scale agreements are "good faith" settlements.
72. 166 Cal. App. 3d at 286, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
73. Id. at 289, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
tortfeasor has the right to make the most advantageous settlement
possible, the settling tortfeasor should have no right to make a settle-
ment which shifts all liability to the non-settling tortfeasors. 4
Chief Justice Bird, in her dissent to Tech-Bilt, strongly supported
the continued use of the "tortious conduct" test. She proclaimed that
a "settlement satisfies the good faith requirements if it is free of cor-
rupt intent, i.e., free of intent to injure the interests of the non-set-
tling tortfeasor." 5 An intent on the part of a settling tortfeasor to
injure the interests of non-settling tortfeasors is an inherent by-prod-
uct of sliding scale agreements. However, as a result of the majority
opinion in Tech-Bilt, the "tortious conduct" test is no longer used to
measure "good faith" in unconditional settlements. Similarly, there
is no reason it should be used for sliding scale agreements.
Applying the "Reasonable Range" Test
Prior to Tech-Bilt, the appellate courts occasionally applied a
"reasonable range" test to sliding scale agreements. When the test
was applied, two different methods were used, each potentially
reaching an opposite result.
Under the first method, the courts analyzed whether the amount
guaranteed, rather than the amount actually paid by the settling
tortfeasor, was within a reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's
proportionate share of liability. The court in Anderson v. Interna-
tional Harvester70  used this approach, finding the guaranteed
amount of $900,000 within a reasonable range of International Har-
vester's potential liability." In their decision, the court merely paid
lip service to any thought of fairness to the non-settling tortfeasor.
The settling tortfeasor never paid the $900,000, nor was it probable
that he would. Where the settling tortfeasor ultimately pays nothing,
use of the guaranteed amount to apply the "reasonable range" test is
meaningless. Yet without guidelines from either the legislature or
the supreme court, the lower courts can easily fall into the trap.
The "reasonable range" test, when applied to the amount actually
paid, rather than the amount guaranteed by the settling tortfeasor,
appears to be the method most closely in line with the policy under-
lying Tech-Bilt. This test was used in River Garden Farms and
Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad.78 The plaintiff in Torres, an em-
ployee of Union Pacific, lost an eye while using a defective jack. He
74. Grant, supra note 52, at 1416.
75. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 502, 698 P.2d at 169, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 266 (Bird,
C.J., dissenting).
76. 165 Cal. App. 3d 100, 211 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985) (decertified). See supra
note 2.
77. Id. at 110, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
78. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
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brought an action against the railroad and the manufacturer of the
jack. The plaintiff settled with Union Pacific for a $200,000 guaran-
tee, $50,000 of which was an outright settlement paid by Union Pa-
cific. The plaintiff then settled with the manufacturer for $300,000.
Union Pacific was only liable for the $50,000 payment it had already
made since the plaintiff recovered more than the $200,000 guarantee
from the manufacturer. The manufacturer sought disapproval of
Union Pacific's settlement, but the court, using a "reasonable range"
test, stated that "$50,000 was not grossly disproportionate to what a
reasonable person, at the time of settlement, would estimate Union's
liability to be." 9 The court did not consider the larger $200,000
guarantee in applying the test; use of this method would result in
fewer "good faith" settlements." The Torres court, however, justi-
fied its decision by stating:
This holding should discourage fraudulent or sham settlements, as well as
settlements which are unfair simply because they are "too cheap." By the
same token, this standard should encourage defendants who really do wish
to "close the book" on a matter, to arrive at a settlement figure which bears
some relationship to what is fair.81
If Tech-Bilt's theme of "fairness" is to be applied to sliding scale
agreements, courts must consider the amount unconditionally paid
by the settling tortfeasor rather than the amount guaranteed or the
amount loaned, to determine if the agreement is in "good faith."
This alternative is the only way courts can temper the inequitable
impact sliding scale agreements have on non-settling tortfeasors, at
least until the legislature responds.
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Despite the attempt to define "good faith" in Tech-Bilt, much
confusion still exists over the "good faith" standard to be applied to
sliding scale agreements. Because most of the confusion surrounds
the intent behind section 877.5, the legislature must clarify this is-
sue. The legislature should either repeal section 877.5 and enact fur-
ther legislation prohibiting the use of sliding scale agreements, or
amend section 877.5 to correct inequities between the non-settling
and settling tortfeasors. Sliding scale agreements neither encourage
settlement nor maximize the plaintiff's recovery, two of the major
79. Id. at 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
80. Id. at 508, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
81. Id. at 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
goals underlying California's tort contribution legislation.82 Addi-
tionally, the third goal, equitable apportionment of liability, is totally
ignored by sliding scale agreements.
Maximizing Plaintiff Recovery
Maximizing recovery for the plaintiff was the major goal underly-
ing the California Supreme Court decision to adopt the doctrine of
comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 83 In Li, the court
eliminated the contributory negligence doctrine which completely
barred recovery of damages whenever the victim had negligently
contributed to cause his own injury. By contrast, under the compara-
tive negligence doctrine, recovery is diminished only by the victim's
proportionate share of fault. This goal of maximizing recovery was
bolstered in American Motorcyle v. Superior Court.84 The supreme
court, in American Motorcycle, retained joint and several liability
despite the adoption of comparative negligence in Li. The court rea-
soned that even where one tortfeasor cannot pay the full amount of
the judgment because of insolvency, fairness dictates that the plain-
tiff should not be deprived of a full recovery. 5 Consequently, the
remaining tortfeasor must pay this deficiency in addition to his own
fair share.
The circumstances of the typical sliding scale agreement, however,
are unique when compared to the unconditional settlement. The na-
ture of the agreement dictates that the settling tortfeasor is always
solvent. The settling tortfeasor must be capable of paying the
amount guaranteed, or the settlement is fraudulent on its face. Fur-
ther, the non-settling tortfeasor must also be capable of paying the
guaranteed amount, or the settling tortfeasor would not have entered
into the agreement.
The goal of maximizing recovery to the plaintiff through the use
of sliding scale agreements is a fiction. While many sliding scale
agreements offer additional benefits to the plaintiff, such as the
peace of mind of a guaranteed recovery, and often, financing of the
remaining litigation through interest free loans from the settling
tortfeasor, these are merely fringe benefits. Sliding scale agreements
do not further the goal of maximizing plaintiff recovery which
evolved from Li and American Motorcycle. In those cases, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court sought to protect the plaintiff from insolvent
tortfeasors. Where a sliding scale agreement is used, however, the
insolvent tortfeasor problem is non-existent.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 83-93.
83. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
84. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 574 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
85. Id. at 590, 574 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
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Encouragement of Settlements
Settlement of claims is encouraged to promote peace and goodwill,
limit the expense of litigation,86 and reduce the crowded dockets in
our court system.8 7 Tortfeasors are encouraged to settle in two ways.
First, a tortfeasor generally settles for less than what he believes his
ultimate liability would have been had the case proceeded to trial.
Second, the settlement ends the settling tortfeasor's involvement in
the litigation.8 However, encouraging settlement with one joint
tortfeasor often discourages settlement with the remaining joint
tortfeasors. It is difficult to imagine that the legislature did not in-
tend to encourage settlement of the entire case.8 9 But, sliding scale
agreements virtually insure that settlement of the entire case will
never happen. Clauses giving the settling tortfeasor veto power over
settlements with remaining tortfeasors add to this problem. Even ab-
sent such a "veto" provision, the plaintiff's bargaining position may
so improve that little if any possibility exists of a settlement with the
remaining tortfeasors. 90 The plaintiff has nothing to lose and every-
thing to gain by proceeding to trial, especially when financed by a
loan from the settling tortfeasor.
Partial settlement of a case is an acceptable goal only when used
to facilitate, rather than frustrate, eventual total settlement. In a
sliding scale agreement, however, total settlement is the rare excep-
tion to the rule.9' No advantage is obtained by removing one of the
tortfeasors with no chance of removing others. The reduction in
court costs by removing one joint tortfeasor through settlement is
minimal.9 2 In some sliding scale agreement cases, the settling joint
tortfeasor chooses to remain in the case, rather than be dismissed.
93
Thus, although the attractiveness of the sliding scale agreement en-
courages partial settlement, reduced court costs, a major benefit of
settlement, never materializes. Indeed, loans by the settling
tortfeasor to finance the plaintiff's case may very well extend the
litigation, increase court costs, and add to crowded dockets.
86. Roberts, supra note 25, at 889.
87. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
88. Roberts, supra note 25, at 888.
89. Id.
90. Comment, Coexistence of Loan Receipt Agreements and Contribution in Illi-
nois, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 751 (1981).
91. Thornton & Wick, supra note 46, at 228.
92. Roberts, supra note 25, at 889.
93. See, e.g., Anderson, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (decerti-
fled). See supra note 2.
A flaw also exists in the reasoning behind the incentives that en-
courage settlement. Defendants are encouraged to settle knowing the
settlement ends their involvement in the litigation and liability is
limited to a favorably negotiated amount. This finality is guaranteed
by section 877 which eliminates all claims for indemnity against the
settling tortfeasor by non-settling tortfeasors.
The joint tortfeasor settling under a sliding scale agreement, how-
ever, voluntarily waives such finality, opting to gamble on the out-
come of the final judgment. Finality is certainly waived when the
settling tortfeasor chooses to remain in the litigation. Why then
should a tortfeasor be entitled to section 877 immunity from indem-
nity claims, having given, in consideration, an often fictional and
meaningless guarantee?
Equitable Apportionment of Liability
The goals of equitable apportionment of liability and encouraging
settlement are in conflict when settlement is accomplished through a
sliding scale agreement. The goal of encouraging a partial settlement
completely overshadows equitable apportionment. In its Tech-Bilt
decision, the California Supreme Court, quoting the River Garden
Farms court, stated: "If the policy of encouraging settlements is per-
mitted to overwhelm equitable financial sharing, the possibilities of
unfair tactics are multiplied. Neither statutory goal should be ap-
plied to defeat the other. ' '9 4 Equitable apportionment is totally de-
feated when a joint tortfeasor chooses to settle through a sliding
scale settlement. The non-settling tortfeasor might pay the entire
judgment regardless of fault allocations and receive no credit for the
settlement as required, under section 877, in unconditional settle-
ments. The legislature must respond to overcome this complete de-
feat of equitable apportionment.
Recommendations to the Legislature
Two options are open to the legislature to balance the articulated
goals. First, it could enact legislation to completely prohibit sliding
scale settlement agreements, discounting the minimal value associ-
ated with such agreements. Second, it could amend sections 877.5
and 877.6 to prohibit the most prejudicial characteristics of sliding
scale agreements. The second alternative, however, simply converts
the sliding scale agreement into an unconditional settlement.
94. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 494, 698 P.2d at 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (quoting
River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498,
503 (1972)).
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Repeal Section 877.5 and Enact Legislation Prohibiting
Sliding Scale Agreements
Legal commentators have established the following guidelines to
recognize an activity as illegal: 1) the activity is lacking in value or
is of little value relative to the danger it presents to those interests
sought to be protected; 2) distinguishing cases in which the illegal
activity is justified from cases where the activity is without value is
so difficult that certainty of application, deterrence of potential of-
fenders, and ease of administration favor making the activity illegal
under all circumstances. 95
Sliding scale agreements fit within these guidelines. Their only
value, encouragement of partial settlement, is supported by little if
any public policy.96 Thus, sliding scale agreements are of little value
relative to the danger presented to the interests of non-settling
tortfeasors, interests now legally recognized in and protected by the
court under Tech-Bilt. Second, because the settling tortfeasor is al-
ways solvent and capable of negotiating an unconditional settlement
within his "reasonable range" of anticipated liability,97 distinguish-
ing cases in which sliding scale agreements are justified is very diffi-
cult. Additionally, sliding scale agreements fail to deter the settling
tortfeasor from injuring again, as such a tortfeasor typically pays
only a fraction of his proportionate share of liability, if anything at
all. Viewed in this light, sliding scale agreements fit within the estab-
lished guidelines of an illegal activity and should be prohibited by
the legislature.
Legal commentators have stated that sliding scale agreements
cannot be made illegal per se based only upon the difficulty in defin-
ing such agreements.98 These comments, however, were made more
than ten years ago, well before a substantial history of the use of
sliding scale agreements was available for consideration. Further-
more, the statutory definition of the sliding scale agreement found in
section 877.5 includes all of its vital elements.99 Using this definition
in a statute prohibiting sliding scale agreements would promote equi-
table apportionment of liability without sacrificing other goals or
policies.
95. Grant, supra note 52, at 1408.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
97. See supra text accompanying note 85.
98. Grant, supra note 52, at 1408.
99. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West 1980). See supra note 40.
Proposed Amendments to Sections 877.5 and 877.6
Because sliding scale agreements promote partial settlements, a
weaker argument might be made to maintain rather than to prohibit
them. Amendments to sections 877.5 and 877.6 would then be re-
quired to promote the goal of fairness to non-settling tortfeasors rec-
ognized in Tech-Bilt. The definition of "good faith" was left to the
courts. The legislature was incapable of defining the term; the facts
of each case required individual evaluation.100 However, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt has now provided a workable defini-
tion, one that developed after years of inconsistency by the appellate
courts. To avoid potential wavering by the courts, and to make the
intent of the legislature explicit, the Tech-Bilt definition should be
codified within section 877.6.
If the legislature chooses to retain sliding scale agreements, the
following proposed modifications to section 877.5 would eliminate
the major inequities between the settling and non-settling tortfeasors
when sliding scale agreements are used:
1) Require the dismissal of the settling tortfeasor. Dismissal would
eliminate possible action by the settling tortfeasor to prejudice the
proceedings against non-settling tortfeasors. 1°1
2) Prohibit clauses that grant the settling tortfeasor veto power
over subsequent settlements between the plaintiff and remaining
tortfeasors, and clauses that require the plaintiff to appeal the case if
the judgment is less than the guarantee. Such restrictions would pro-
mote the settlement of entire cases rather than partial settlements.10 2
3) Allow the non-settling tortfeasor to seek indemnity from a set-
tling tortfeasor when a sliding scale agreement is used. The settling
tortfeasor using a sliding scale agreement has waived his right to
finality by choosing to gamble on the outcome of a verdict.103 The
benefits of section 877 should require consideration beyond that of
an illusory guarantee. The courts have previously ruled that a "good
faith" settling tortfeasor is not immune from claims of total indem-
nity from non-settling tortfeasors who are vicariously liable.104 This
exception was designed to promote fairness to vicariously liable non-
settling tortfeasors.10 5 The same goal of fairness dictates that the ex-
ception be expanded to include joint tortfeasors choosing to settle
through a sliding scale agreement.
4) Require an unconditional payment by the settling tortfeasor to
100. Comment, supra note 48, at 131.
101. See supra text accompanying note 51.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
103. See supra p. 245-46.
104. Angelus Assoc. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure, 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 403 (1985).
105. Id. at 410, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542.
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the plaintiff that passes the Tech-Bilt "reasonable range" test. Al-
though the courts are presently capable of enforcing such a require-
ment, 10 the requirement should be codified to avoid confusion and
inconsistency by the courts. Where a settling tortfeasor's uncondi-
tional settlement amount is made with an additional sliding scale
guarantee, the guarantee should be merely another factor in consid-
ering whether the unconditional amount is made in "good faith.
'10 7
5) Apply any loans made to the plaintiff by the settling tortfeasor
to offset the judgment against non-settling tortfeasors. Interest free
loans are often included in a sliding scale agreement and are allowed
under section 877.5(b). s08 Section 877(a) provides that a settlement
"shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated
by the release, the dismissal, or the covenant, or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater."'0 9 Certainly, an
interest free loan made to the plaintiff is of some value, and was
bargained for as part of the consideration for the settlement. Thus,
although the parties do not stipulate a value for the interest free loan
in the agreement, the loan has a value equal to at least the amount
of interest charged under conventional financing agreements. No
court yet has considered placing such a value on the loan, to be used
as an offset against any judgment paid by the non-settling defendant,
even though section 877(a) expressly allows for such an offset.'1 0
6) Reduce the plaintiff's claim against non-settling tortfeasors by
the amount of the settling tortfeasor's share of liability. This recom-
mendation was presented by Professor John Fleming in his report to
the Joint Committee of the California Legislature."'" Fleming rec-
ommended that this pro-rata reduction 1 2 be used for all types of
106. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
107. In other words, the unconditional settlement amount might be justified at a
lower amount when accompanied by a sliding scale guarantee.
108. See supra note 40.
109. See supra note 19 (emphasis added).
110. As an example, assume P, the plaintiff, enters into a sliding scale agreement
with defendant Dl. DI guarantees P a $100,000 recovery and also gives P a $100,000
interest free loan until P receives a judgment. Two years after the settlement P receives a
$120,000 judgment against D2. If the current rate of interest is 15% per year, D2 should
receive a credit against the $120,000 judgment of $30,000 (15% of $100,000 x two
years). D2 should then pay P $90,000. Under the sliding scale agreement, DI should
then pay P an additional $10,000 so that the guarantee of $100,000 is satisfied.
11. Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on the
Problems Associated with American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1464, 1498 (1979).
112. A "pro-rata" reduction is a reduction based on the settling tortfeasor's per-
centage of fault. California uses a "pro-tanto" reduction which is to simply deduct the
amount of the settlement from the judgment.
settlements. This proposal would tend to reduce the amount ulti-
mately recovered by the plaintiff. However, Fleming argues, the
plaintiff remains the sole arbiter in deciding whether to settle, and if
so, the settlement amount. If the plaintiff wishes to avoid the risk of
an undervalued settlement, he need not settle at all. On the other
hand, the plaintiff is given strong incentive to drive the hardest bar-
gain with the settling tortfeasor and not to prejudice the remaining
tortfeasors. 113 The legislature has not yet adopted Professor Flem-
ing's recommendation. Public policy may still dictate that such a
recommendation is too detrimental to the injured plaintiff. When ap-
plied to sliding scale agreements, however, this proposal would mini-
mize the detriment to the plaintiff, yet promote fairness towards
non-settling tortfeasors and give the settling tortfeasor incentive to
settle.
Consider this example: The plaintiff is seriously injured by D1 and
D2. DI is ten percent at fault; D2 is ninety percent at fault. D2, the
settling tortfeasor, enters into a sliding scale agreement with the
plaintiff, guaranteeing a two million dollar recovery against D1. The
plaintiff obtains a verdict against D1, the non-settling tortfeasor, for
three million dollars. Applying the recommendation, D1 pays
$300,000, ten percent of the three million dollar judgment. D2, who
guaranteed two million dollars to the plaintiff, contributes an addi-
tional $1.7 million. The plaintiff ends up with a recovery of two mil-
lion dollars, an amount he was satisfied with prior to trial because he
negotiated the guarantee with D2. D1 pays only his fair share, while
D2 still pays less than the amount he guaranteed, and far less than
his fair share of the three million dollar verdict.
The same rationale applies when the verdict is less than the guar-
anteed amount. If the verdict was for one million dollars and the
guarantee was for two million dollars, D1 would pay his fair share,
$100,000. D2 would have to pay the plaintiff two million dollars less
Dl's payment, or $1.9 million. The plaintiff recovers an amount
greater than the verdict and D2 still pays less than the amount he
was willing to guarantee.
Under this arrangement, D2, the settling tortfeasor, will always
contribute to the plaintiff's recovery. This outcome hardly seems un-
fair considering the settling tortfeasor was much more at fault than
the non-settling tortfeasor 114 Paraphrasing Professor Fleming, if the
settling tortfeasor wishes to avoid the risk of an overvalued settle-
ment, he need not settle at all. On the other hand, however, he is
113. Fleming, supra note 111, at 1496.
114. The recommendation also applies when the settling tortfeasor is less at fault
than the non-settling tortfeasor. However, it is difficult to reason why a tortfeasor would
guarantee a substantial judgment when its degree of fault is much less than the non-
settling tortfeasor's degree of fault.
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given a strong incentive to drive the hardest bargain with the plain-
tiff and to not prejudice the remaining tortfeasors." 5
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court decision in Tech-Bilt v. Wood-
ward-Clyde recognized the duty of economic fairness owed to non-
settling joint tortfeasors by the plaintiff and settling joint tortfeasor.
This decision enables the courts to reject patently unfair uncondi-
tional settlements. However, Tech-Bilt did not directly address one
of the most unfair settlement tactics in use today, the sliding scale
agreement. Two cases involving sliding scale agreements are cur-
rently before the California Supreme Court."1 6 The court thus has
the opportunity to apply the Tech-Bilt requirements to sliding scale
agreements and find that these agreements are not "good faith" set-
tlements; this opportunity must not be wasted.
Even if the court applies the Tech-Bilt requirements, legislative
action will be necessary to ensure the protection of non-settling
tortfeasors. Because sliding scale agreements are of little value in
accomplishing the expressed goals of the legislature, sliding scale
agreements should be prohibited. Should the legislature desire to sal-
vage the minimal value associated with sliding scale agreements,
however, this Comment has proposed amendments to minimize the
economic burden presently borne by non-settling tortfeasors. As
Dean Prosser observed, "[T] here is obvious lack of sense and justice
in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two
defendants were . ..unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered
onto one alone, . . while the latter goes scot free.""' 7
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